![]() ![]() If we give up on the constitution condition then emergent properties threaten to 'float free' of the underlying processes and to become mysterious or magical. Mark Bedau puts the issue of defining emergence in terms of the question of whether there is room for a well-defined notion of a property which is both autonomous but also constituted by the underlying processes. not all properties of whole systems are automatically emergent. it makes room for some actual properties to be emergent, and it needs to be non-trivial, i.e. Thus at the very least, an adequate definition of emergent needs to be non-vacuous, i.e. Putative emergent properties might include mental states such as beliefs, stock market crashes, hurricane formation, and so on.ġ.2 It is generally agreed that some properties of systems are emergent and others are not. As typically used, the term "emergent" is applied to certain properties of whole systems of interacting parts, whether it is a brain made up of individual neurons, an anthill made up of individual ants, or an economy made up of individual investors. I also examine the implications of this definition for the epistemological role of emergent properties in prediction and in explanation.ġ.1 Philosophers in areas ranging from the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of science to metaphysics have long been interested in emergence, and especially in trying to carve out a coherent definition of this elusive yet potentially very useful concept. In this paper I investigate the pros and cons of this approach, focusing in particular on whether an appropriately distinct boundary can be drawn between simulation-based and non-simulation-based methods. One approach to characterizing the elusive notion of emergence is to define that a property is emergent if and only if its presence can be derived but only by simulation.
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